A New Zealand thought experiment about platform accountability
Backing Families.
Protecting Wisdom.
Our parents and grandparents deserve to be safe online. That's why we're calling for a maximum age of 60 for social media.
Read the CaseWhat is After60?
After60 is a campaign for a maximum social media age of 60, to protect older New Zealanders from algorithmic harm: addictive design, engagement loops that keep people scrolling, and recommendation systems that steer them toward extremes.
We are not anti-technology. Nana can still video-call the mokopuna. We're not suggesting older Kiwis can't handle themselves. But these platforms weren't built to help them.
New Zealand's conversation about online safety has focused almost entirely on young people. That's understandable. But if we're serious about platform accountability, we should be asking harder questions about who else is being harmed, and why holding platforms to account has proven so hard.
Why 60?
60 is the right place to draw the line because adults over 60 deserve protection from the same pressures, comparisons, and addictive design everyone else faces. Staying ahead of online scams and disinformation gets harder as both evolve faster than most people can track, and social isolation makes online community feel essential, even when that community is a flat-earth group, a fake investment platform, or a romance scammer.
Their experience is real, and on familiar ground their judgment is sharp. But social media is built to hold attention and slip past the instincts people rely on everywhere else, and it does that no matter how much life experience someone brings to it. In New Zealand, even the people who say they can always recognise a scam still lost an average of NZ$4,029 last year (Netsafe & the Global Anti-Scam Alliance, 2025). Confidence isn't protection.
The Lie Outlasts the Correction
Older adults aren't the gullible ones. Hand them a false headline cold and they'll often beat a twenty-year-old at spotting it. The crack is narrower: with age you're more likely to keep the claim but forget where it came from, so the fact-check fades while the familiar lie sticks (Brashier & Schacter, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2020). Mum didn't go looking for it; the feed just kept showing it until the truth wore off.
They're Specifically Targeted
Scammers deliberately target over-60s. Romance fraud, investment scams, crypto schemes, tech-support fraud; older adults now lose more money to scams that start on social media than through any other contact method (FTC, 2025). The platforms know this.
The Radicalisation Pipeline
Facebook's own internal researchers found that its recommendation tools were driving membership in extremist groups: "64% of all extremist group joins are due to our recommendation tools", from a 2016 internal presentation reported by the Wall Street Journal in May 2020.
A third of New Zealanders who reported a scam to the platform say nothing was done about it.
Almost two-thirds saw no action taken, or never found out what happened.
Netsafe & the Global Anti-Scam Alliance, State of Scams in New Zealand 2025But Here's the Thing.
By now you've read our case for a maximum age of 60. Here's the thing: we don't actually want to ban anyone over 60 from social media.
That would be patronising overreach: it treats a whole demographic as incapable of choosing for themselves while doing little about the actual problem.
Sound familiar?
The arguments used to justify a social media ban for those under 16 are familiar: cognitive vulnerability, susceptibility to manipulation, algorithmic harm, exposure to scammers, the need for protection from addictive design. None of them stop at the under-16 line. They describe a lot of adults over 60 too. Children may be the most exposed. But if the same harms run well past the group the ban covers, the question isn't only who we protect; it's whether an age gate protects anyone.
There's an obvious objection here: kids are different.
They are. A fourteen-year-old can't sign a contract, buy alcohol, or vote. And the strongest objection runs deeper than legal lines: adolescence is a formative window, and harm during it shapes who someone becomes in a way the same harm at sixty doesn't. Granted. The harm really is worse the younger you are.
But that's a reason to help children first, not to gate them out. A gate removes the user from the platform; accountability removes the harm. We age-gate alcohol because it can't be made safe; a platform's harm is in its design, and design can be changed. Fixing the platform helps the worst-affected most while protecting everyone else; gating one group out leaves the harm running for every adult, and for the children too once the gate leaks.
The Before16 campaign is raising an important alarm about real harms. We share that concern. The platforms engineered the harm and bank the profit.
But age gates are a blunt instrument, and an easier one to campaign for than the actual fix, because the actual fix means taking on some of the most powerful companies in human history. A gate puts the burden on users and parents; accountability moves it to the platforms. Why not both? Because the gate isn't free: it spends the political will and public patience this fight gets exactly once, it builds the age-verification machinery that becomes its own liability, and it lets everyone declare the problem solved while the platform keeps running untouched. An age gate doesn't sit alongside the real fix. It stands in for it.
It doesn't even work on the people it's meant for. A determined fifteen-year-old has always been able to lie about their birthday, borrow a sibling's login, or use a free VPN; these are the first suggestions in any group chat where someone mentions the ban. The only kid it stops is the one who wasn't trying to get past it. And the cost of chasing the rest falls on everyone: an age gate means age verification for every user on the platform, a store of IDs that doesn't currently exist, sitting on servers waiting for a breach. The critics of B416 have made exactly this point: everyone pays, not just the group being "protected".
That is what enforcement looks like when it runs through the user. Requiring platforms to design their systems responsibly is a different kind of obligation; it sits with the platform, not the person trying to log in. There's no VPN for that.
Banning a demographic from a platform doesn't fix the platform. It shifts the harm, drives it underground, or hands it back to the family members who were already struggling. What New Zealand needs is to make the platforms safe for everyone.
What We Actually Want
If we're serious about protecting all New Zealanders from social media harm, young and old, here's what works:
- Algorithmic duty of care — if you profit from the algorithm, you are responsible for its foreseeable harms; platforms must assess and mitigate what their recommendation systems do to people
- A Digital Safety Commissioner with algorithm audit powers — we need an independent regulator that can compel platform transparency, investigate algorithmic harms, and actually sanction, not just publish guidelines. New Zealand designed exactly this kind of regulator, had the major platforms' support for its objectives, and scrapped it in 2024 (DIA Summary of Submissions, 2024). Brazil did this in 2025, requiring transparency reports and banning the profiling of minors, not the minors themselves (Lei 15.211/2025)
- Mandatory scam and fraud detection — platforms must actively identify and disrupt fraud using behavioural signals and on-device analysis (methods that don't require reading private messages); those that can't demonstrate they tried should be accountable for the harm
- An end to manipulative design and a right to a chronological feed — platforms should not be permitted to use design features built to extend your time on the platform past what you'd choose: endless scrolling and notifications engineered to pull you back. Every user should be able to opt for a plain chronological feed, by law
- No universal age verification mandates — age-verification infrastructure creates data collection and breach risk for every user on the platform, not just the group being "protected". The IDs people hand over for these checks are a target, not a hypothetical: a 2025 breach exposed roughly 70,000 government-ID images submitted for Discord's age verification (Discord, October 2025), and Australia's Age Assurance Technology Trial flagged providers holding more personal data than they needed (final report, 2025)
- Digital literacy and adequately funded mental health services — better platforms reduce harm but don't eliminate it; people need the skills to navigate online spaces, and accessible support for when things go wrong
Some of these arguments were sharpened by the Stop B416 campaign, worth reading regardless of where you land on the original question.
References
The claims and figures cited on this page, with their sources, in order of appearance:
- Netsafe & the Global Anti-Scam Alliance. State of Scams in New Zealand 2025. resource.netsafe.org.nz
- Nadia M. Brashier & Daniel L. Schacter (2020). “Aging in an Era of Fake News.” Current Directions in Psychological Science, 29(3), 316–322. doi.org/10.1177/0963721420915872
- Federal Trade Commission (December 2025). Protecting Older Consumers 2024–2025: A Report of the Federal Trade Commission. ftc.gov
- Jeff Horwitz & Deepa Seetharaman (26 May 2020). “Facebook Executives Shut Down Efforts to Make the Site Less Divisive.” The Wall Street Journal. The “64%” figure is from Facebook’s internal 2016 presentation (researcher Monica Lee); the analysis concerned German political groups; the full article is reproduced in the U.S. congressional record. congress.gov
- New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs (April 2024). Safer Online Services and Media Platforms: Summary of Submissions. dia.govt.nz
- Federative Republic of Brazil (17 September 2025). Lei nº 15.211/2025 (Estatuto Digital da Criança e do Adolescente). planalto.gov.br
- Discord (October 2025). “Update on a Security Incident Involving Third-Party Customer Service.” discord.com
- Australian Government, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts (2025). Age Assurance Technology Trial, Final Report. infrastructure.gov.au